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Introduction: The Constitutional Law and Politics of
Reproductive Rights
In the fall of 2008, Yale Law School sponsored a conference on the future
of sexual and reproductive rights. Panels on law, politics, history, sociology,
social science, and the media addressed conflicts over sexual and reproductive
rights in the last several decades.' The Essays The Yale Law Journal has chosen
to publish from this conference concern the constitutional law and politics of
reproductive rights.
In How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion
Wars,2 Neal Devins examines what conflicts over Roe v. Wade3 reveal about the
relation of constitutional law and public opinion. Devins sees majority
convictions as exerting orienting force in the law. By the time of Roe, Devins
emphasizes, the public disapproved of the criminalization of abortion, at least
in cases of fetal impairment. Roe triggered backlash, in part, he argues, because
the Court protected abortion later in pregnancy than the public thought
reasonable and, in part, because of Roe's association with a growing women's
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor of Law, Yale University.
1. Panels during the three-day conference were entitled: Uncomfortable Conversation: The
Constitutional Law and Politics of Sexual and Reproductive Rights; Sexual and
Reproductive Rights: Dignity, Liberty, and Equality; Covering the Courts; Remembering
Catherine Roraback and Connecticut's Role in Sexual and Reproductive Rights; Roe's
History; Family Values; The Facts of the Matter: Science, Public Health, and Counseling;
Movement/Countermovement; Crossing Borders: Transnational Perspectives on Sexual
and Reproductive Rights; and The Future of Sexual and Reproductive Rights.
2. Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the Abortion Wars, 118
YALE L.J. 1318 (2009).
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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rights movement.4  Ensuing efforts to overrule Roe through judicial
appointments also prompted backlash because these efforts were out of line
with public opinion.' In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,6 the Court was able to
stabilize this conflict by adopting a "compromise" allowing incremental
regulation of abortion from the onset of pregnancy that "mirrored public
opinion in 1992 and ... mirrors public opinion today."' Devins tells a big-
picture story focused on national majorities, rather than regional or religious
minorities, that tends to conflate public opinion concerning the timeframe,
justifications, and regulatory oversight of abortion. The moral of his story is
that law does not shape public opinion; instead, public opinion shapes law.
Advocates who want to alter access to abortion need to address the public's
beliefs, and they will not do so successfully through law.
Devins's story focuses on national polling data concerning abortion-not
the lived experience or social meaning of the act. In TRAPing Roe in Indiana
and the Common-Ground Alternative,8 Dawn Johnsen shows how law shapes the
circumstances of women who are making decisions about whether to continue
a pregnancy. Johnsen agrees with Devins that conservatives have not
undermined Roe in its broadest outlines, but she warns that the devil is in the
details. She offers a case study of the regulation of clinics in Indiana, and finds
harm in the very forms of incremental regulation that Devins suggests satisfy
the public's desire for compromise. Examining in detail legislation enacted in
Indiana, Johnsen shows how incremental restrictions, which are designed to
send messages of collective ambivalence or disapproval, can translate into
functional barriers to access that disproportionately burden poor and young
women.9 As she illustrates, incremental restrictions that appear to strike a
reasonable compromise may inflict unequal injuries in practice. Invoking the
example of voting rights, Johnsen urges that "[a]t times analyzing the contours
of a right requires delving deeply into the practicalities of the exercise and
oversight of that right."1° Johnsen differentiates between compromise and
common ground, and insists it is the latter that we must find. "A common-
4. Devins, supra note 2, at 1325 ("The backlash against Roe, in part, was a backlash against
feminism, for the decision came to embody the core aims of the women's liberation
movement." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
s. Id. at 1331.
6. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
7. Devins, supra note 2, at 1338.
8. Dawn Johnsen, "TRAP"ing Roe in Indiana and a Common-Ground Alternative, 118 YALE L.J.
1356 (2009).
9. See id. at 138o-81.
10. Id. at 1387.
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ground approach should situate abortion where it logically belongs as a matter
of public policy and constitutional values: within a broader agenda that
empowers individuals both to prevent unintended pregnancy and to choose
wanted childbearing through a range of government-supported programs for
women and families."11
Like Johnsen, Robin West believes that reproductive rights law is harming
women but suggests that the women's movement is at least partly to blame. In
From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights,"
West objects to the dearth of "pro-choice criticism of Roe,"'3 offering a critique
of reproductive rights scholarship in the tradition of "various critiques of
negative rights, of the Left's reliance on courts to create and protect them, and
of the liberal-legal political commitments that underlie them, that were
pioneered by the critical legal scholarship of the 197os and 198OS."' She argues
that legal protections for choice legitimate injustice in the social conditions
within which choice is exercised, that reliance on courts exacerbates
"anti-democratic features of U.S. constitutionalism, to women's detriment,""s
and that arguments for court-enforced rights lead the women's movement to
ask for less social change than it did in the 1970s. West subjects abortion rights
to a progressive critique that applies to all judicially enforced constitutional
rights, yet she also advances specific descriptive and causal claims. West asserts
that the women's movement's commitment to Roe inhibited it from criticizing
Roe, 6 and led it to focus on courts in ways that exacted political, rhetorical, and
moral "opportunity CoStS. 1 7 West holds these failures of feminist critique and
politics significantly responsible for the state of the law today: a "shift in
focus away from courts and to more democratic fora, might open the door to
moral and political opportunities to which we have been blinded by the light of.
the promises of a living Constitution. "" Strikingly, West does not survey
feminist scholarship, nor does she discuss feminist legislative efforts to provide
sexual education and access to contraception, to combat violence against
11. Id. at 1389.
12. Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118
YALE L.J. 1394 (2009).
13. Id. at 1397.
14. Id. at 1405.
is. Id. at 1406.
16. Id. at 1399-1401.
17. Id. at 1426.
18. See id. at 1427-30.
19. Id. at 1431.
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women, and to protect women's decisions about motherhood through the
Freedom of Choice Act, welfare reform, publicly supported child care, and a
family-friendly workplace. Nor does West discuss the role that conservatives
played in blunting these efforts. Rather, she writes in a tradition of scholarship
dominant in the academy in the 1970s and 198os premised on the faith that
Left-Left critique makes progressivism stronger.
Since entering teaching, I have sought to defend the abortion right by
re-theorizing it on sex-equality grounds, addressing readers from Left to
Center.2" But decades of conservative mobilization led me to focus, in abortion
rights and many other contexts, on how social movement conflict of the
Left-Right kind shapes the articulation of constitutional norms in courts and
politics. 1 This is the approach of my Yale Law Journal essay published on the
2o. I have written a number of articles in this register, as have many defenders of the abortion
right. For an overview, see Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights:
Their Critical Basis and Evolving ;Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007). The
equality argument can, and often does, begin with far-reaching critique of Roe. See, e.g.,
Reva B. Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 274 (1992) ("Because Roe and its progeny
treat pregnancy as a physiological problem, they obscure the extent to which the community
that would regulate a woman's reproductive choices is in fact implicated in them,
responsible for defining motherhood in ways that impose material deprivations and
dignitary injuries on those who perform its work.... Roe's account of the abortion decision
invites criticism of the abortion right as an instrument of feminine expedience . .. because it
presents the burdens of motherhood as woman's destiny and dilemma-a condition for
which no other social actor bears responsibility."); id. at 272-80, 38o-81; see also Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
REv. 375, 386 (1985) ("Overall, the Court's Roe position is weakened, I believe, by the
opinion's concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the exclusion of a
constitutionally based sex-equality perspective."); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1020 (1984) ("The rhetoric of privacy, as opposed to
equality, blunts our ability to focus on the fact that it is women who are oppressed when
abortion is denied.... The rhetoric of privacy also reinforces a public/private dicotomy that
is at the heart of the structures that perpetuate the powerlessness of women."); Catharine
MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade: A Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 45, 52-53 (J.L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) (criticizing Roe's basis
in privacy instead of equality, and claiming that this choice resulted in Harris v. McRae's
holding that public funding for abortions is not constitutionally required).
21. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change:
The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1323 (2006) (discussing the Equal Rights
Amendment); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in
Heller, 122 HARv. L. REv. 191 (2008) (discussing gun rights); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk:
Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117
HARV. L. REv. 1470 (2004) (discussing race equality); Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons:
Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE
L.J. 1641 (2008) (discussing abortion rights).
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eve of the symposium, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions
Under Casey/Carhart,22 which surveys efforts of the antiabortion movement to
eviscerate Roe 3 and offers a normative rejoinder that can be asserted in
constitutional politics. The "dignity" framework I offer for the regulation of
abortion contemplates ongoing struggle over this widely shared normative
commitment, much as we see conflict over other core concepts in the abortion
debate such as "health" and "freedom." The framework in fact derives from the
Court's cases, which reflect this agonistic logic. In Planned Parenthood v.
Casey,' the Supreme Court reasoned that protecting a woman's decision
whether to bear a child protected a woman's dignity,2" whereas in Gonzales v.
Carhart,6 the Court allowed the government to restrict abortion to express
respect for the dignity of unborn life. 7 In due process and equal protection
cases, "constitutional protections for dignity vindicate, often concurrently, the
value of life, the value of liberty, and the value of equality. " "8 Attending to
these shifts in usage, I read Casey and Carhart as allowing government to
regulate abortion in ways that demonstrate respect for the dignity of human
life so long as such regulation also demonstrates respect for the dignity of
women.29 This normative framework offers reasons, which can be asserted in
adjudicative, legislative, or popular arenas, to constrain woman-protective and
fetal-protective regulation of abortion, whether the proposed restrictions are
incremental (for example, counseling) or categorical (for example, criminal
sanctions) .30
The Essays The Yale Law Journal is publishing from the conference offer
very different views on the role of courts in defending reproductive rights.
None imagines that adjudication is the only, or even the primary, arena in
which this society will define and defend reproductive justice. Some believe we
would be stronger if we abandoned hope of adjudication and recognized
judicial review as merely a reflection of modal public opinion or a distraction
22. Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart
117 YALE L.J. 1694 (2008).
23. Id. at 17o6-34 (surveying intramovement debates about the reach and rationale of
restrictions most likely to bring an end to the practice of abortion).
24. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
25. See id. at 851.
26. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
27. Id. at 158.
a8. Siegel, supra note 22, at 1736; see id. at 1735-45.
29. Id. at 1751-52.
30. See id. at 1753-18oo.
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from politics. Others view judicial review's connection to and distance from
politics as its strength, enabling courts to provide an arena in which we can
reflect on how to live with the deepest conflicts that shape our collective lives.
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